What Diplomatic Solutions?

There’s two requirements for diplomatic solutions short of seeking an unconditional surrender that requires military solutions to geopolitical issues:
1). Each Party of the diplomatic negotiations meet as equals regardless of what is effectively considered ‘paper strength’ (paper strength is overall measurements of economics like GDP, military strength, and etc). The CIA Fact-Book estimates falls under ‘paper strength’.

2). Each Party of the diplomatic negotiations interests have to be acknowledged and recognized. This is sphere of influence centered.

To put it summarily, there is no diplomatic solutions to the present geopolitical issues.

For the long form:

With recent geopolitical issues surrounding North Korea, I’ll stick to situations surrounding North Korea:

North Korea exists today because China entered the Korean War with what was considered out of date equipment and munitions that fought the US forces to a stalemate and forced the truce re-establishing the North Korean regime that the US had for all purposes annihilated. China did this because it saw North Korea function as a buffer zone between Sino-US interests.

Here are a few posts featured on my WordPress reader in no particular order:




Now, here is an article discussing North Korea’s interests largely simplified


… And, she cautions, if you understand North Korea’s point of view, you’ll see why Trump’s comments might be just what North Korean dictator Kim Jong Un was looking for.

Threatening war or military action against North Korea … works more towards the advantage of North Korea, not our advantage. After all, it’s a totalitarian regime—it uses threats from the U.S. to consolidate control within the country. It represses its people. The more that North Korea can create the perception of an outside threat, the more it can control the internal domestic situation. That gives the regime more power internally, which it can use externally.

To translate, North Korea’s saber-rattling is meant to draw a forceful response from the US, so it can turn to China to emphasize its continued necessity to serve as a Sino-US buffer zone. It’s largely North Korea’s main card that’s why it sees developing nuclear weapons capacity as vital to its continued existence, which is partially referenced in another article

North Korea’s populace is considered North Korean regime property aka human capital-resources or otherwise public property.


Sean Illing

Is the current stand-off between the US and North Korea as much a test for China as it is for Trump?

Ely Ratner

It depends what you mean by “test.” It’s certainly a difficult situation for China because their preference would be for North Korea to cool down and stop testing missiles and enter into some kind of negotiation track with the US, but it just doesn’t appear that the North Koreans are prepared to do that…

Sean Illing

Is North Korea’s continued testing of missiles a defiance of China as much as it is the US?

Ely Ratner

Absolutely. There’s no question about that.

Sean Illing

China has a lot of leverage over North Korea, being its biggest trading partner and main source of food and energy. Why are they struggling to curb the regime’s behavior?

Ely Ratner

They’ve lost political leverage in part because the North Korean regime has killed some of the interlocutors with China and so they don’t have a real healthy political channel right now. China does have enormous economic leverage over North Korea, but again they’re unwilling to use it for fear of destabilizing the North Korean regime. So yes, they have leverage, but they’re going to be reluctant to use it.

North Korea seeks nuclear capacities to compel China’s continued propping without also requiring to become what was once termed ‘running dog’, which effectively means puppet. The reference to stability is a reference that China maintains a significant force near/along the North Korean-Sino border complete with aerial support, and Russia possesses aerial projection to the northeast of the Korean-Sino border.

To put it bluntly, China is hesitant to place North Korea onto death’s ground and adapt an annihilated already mentality similar to Japan’s towards the end of World War II deploying Kamikaze tactics. This article discusses the possibility


If it faces internal collapse, it may view that it has nothing to lose from initiating one of the highest-stakes gambles in the history of humanity.

The author discusses a regional worst-case scenario that is interesting to read, but it centers heavily on containment and Mutual Assured Destruction (MAD).

For example, abroad analysts of the Soviet Union determined its collapse on: The world’s reserve currency status determines the winner of Cold Wars, and the Soviet’s failed to directly challenge the US citing the Cuban Missile Crisis. The central basis for that failure was the Soviet’s believed in the Leninist-Marxist dialectic guaranteed its eventual domination and therefore had the advantage of time and proved wrong.

Here’s another worst-case scenario


North Korea has nuclear-armed missiles and satellites potentially capable of electromagnetic pulse (EMP) attack. EMP is considered by many the most politically acceptable use of a nuclear weapon, because the high-altitude detonation (above 30 kilometers) produces no blast, thermal, or radioactive fallout effects harmful to people.

In this scenario, North Korea makes an EMP attack on Japan and South Korea to achieve its three most important foreign policy goals: reunification with South Korea, revenge upon Japan for World War II, and recognition of North Korea as a world power.

As a consequence of the EMP attack, Japan’s critical infrastructures are paralyzed and incapable of transporting U.S. forces to aid South Korea…

In a final act of vengeance, Kim detonates the super-EMP warhead in his KMS-4 satellite, blacking out the United States.

First, if we’re going to look at worst-case scenarios, we have to first look at the war-game scenarios conducted by the War College who citing the US military unconventional warfare focus as a lose-lose proposition against Russia, against China, and against Russo-Sino pact.

This means any worst-case scenario featuring buffer zones of either Russia or China who in 2009 began making economic and military pacts requires encompassing Russia and China into the worst-case scenarios regardless what their ‘media mouth piece’s say’.

Second, if North Korea were to adapt a annihilated already stance, they would EMP the Continental US and Japan as simultaneously as possible completely dislodging command-control and communications in addition to decoupling technological links in US military’s sophisticated weaponry, which respectively renders them either moot or far less accurate than otherwise.

Third, the threat of nuclear warheads as Negasaki and Hiroshima nuclear weapon’s usage under the basis nuclear weapons possess no strategic benefit shifts to tactics that means if you don’t aim to occupy it or otherwise wish to achieve disable a rival as much as possible. Nuclear targets become bases, economic centers, and ports you can’t or deem not strategic to occupy but inflicts maximum damage to disable your rival power’s capacities.

Fourth, I highly doubt that Russia and China wouldn’t utilize renewed Korean War to pursue their interests especially if they don’t aim to directly aid North Korea.

One might want to take a closer look at positioning over paper strength; the US’s lion’s share of its fighting forces are in the Middle East and Korean Peninsula. NATO is required to hold the brunt of European defenses from the Baltic to Ukraine with US forces largely focused on support. Russia’s top three deployments are near Ukraine, Arctic, and Cuba while China’s are northeast of Kashmir, near Bangladesh in the latest standoff with India, and along the North Korean-Sino border. It’s aerial power is deeply flexible with the island building campaign in the South and East China Seas.

This brings us to articles discussing possible diplomatic issues


… it requires us to think carefully about what could actually persuade China to cut off its support for the North Korean regime. And that leads us to a previously unthinkable idea: giving real consideration to removing all American troops from a unified peninsula in exchange for China proactively leading the transition to a unified Korea. Though it has been unthinkable for years—and still may be—such a deal would also create a kind of leverage that nothing else has.

… Unification, China believes, likely would end with the U.S. military on its border, an unacceptable risk.

The answer is yes. In fact, many national security experts know what the Chinese would demand: China wants the U.S. military off the peninsula. South Korea is a vital defense, security and trade partner of the United States.

(Bold emphasis mine)

The sheer fact South Korea is part of the global economy promoted through globalization whose principle economic center Seoul interconnected link in the globalization chain along with Taiwan and Singapore are well within striking distance of China, such an agreement spells the end of the US Dollar’s world’s reserve currency status, which US GDP is dependent upon making economic centers of globalization its national interest to defend by any means necessary.



Yet Beijing has been upset by complaints from Washington and Tokyo it is not doing enough to rein in North Korea. The foreign ministry last month called for an end to what it termed the “China responsibility theory”.

The China responsibility theory rests in China severing its prompting that requires it to also follow through with utilizing its significant force near/along the Korean-Sino border. This is a diplomatic catch-22 as China’s economic-military pacts are undoubtedly watching the situations develop. It’s more in China’s strategic interests to leave North Korea in play, but it’s not in the US strategic interests that’s the central problem and North Korea knows it.

The entire affair rests in violating two requirements of diplomatic solutions:
-Diplomatic negotiation participants meet as equals.
-Sphere’s of influence must be taken into account

Without these two requirements, diplomatic solutions reach negative returns resulting in military options for military solutions of geopolitical issues.

It is classically military doctrine to seize and maintain the initiative, and there can be no initiative to seize or maintain if no military solutions are being offered as solutions.

Frankly, I wish people would make up their blasted minds. You can either support globalization as national interests blurred into national defense requiring geopolitical solutions to include military options, or you can have economic treaties that you can drop without being peer-pressured into over fears of having the cookie jar slammed shut…


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